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Sunday, September 25, 2005

Matthew Scully:Fear Factories: The Case for Compassionate Conservatism – for Animals

Fear Factories: The Case for Compassionate Conservatism – for Animals
By Matthew Scully
The American Conservative, May 23, 2005

http://www.matthewscully.com/fear_factories.htm

A few years ago I began a book about cruelty to animals and about factory farming in particular, problems that had been in the back of my mind for a long while. At the time I viewed factory farming as one of the lesser problems facing humanity—a small wrong on the grand scale of good and evil but too casually overlooked and too glibly excused.

This view changed as I acquainted myself with the details and saw a few typical farms up close. By the time I finished the book, I had come to view the abuses of industrial farming as a serious moral problem, a truly rotten business for good reason passed over in polite conversation. Little wrongs, when left unattended, can grow and spread to become grave wrongs, and precisely this had happened on our factory farms.

The result of these ruminations was Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy. And though my tome never quite hit the bestseller lists, there ought to be some special literary prize for a work highly recommended in both the Wall Street Journal and Vegetarian Teen. When you enjoy the accolades of PETA and Policy Review, Deepak Chopra and Gordon Liddy, Peter Singer and Charles Colson, you can at least take comfort in the diversity of your readership.

The book also provided an occasion for fellow conservatives to get beyond their dislike for particular animal-rights groups and to examine cruelty issues on the merits. Conservatives have a way of dismissing the subject, as if where animals are concerned nothing very serious could ever be at stake. And though it is not exactly true that liberals care more about these issues—you are no more likely to find reflections or exposés concerning cruelty in The Nation or The New Republic than in any journal of the Right—it is assumed that animal-protection causes are a project of the Left, and that the proper conservative position is to stand warily and firmly against them.

I had a hunch that the problem was largely one of presentation and that by applying their own principles to animal-welfare issues conservatives would find plenty of reasons to be appalled. More to the point, having acknowledged the problems of cruelty, we could then support reasonable remedies. Conservatives, after all, aren’t shy about discoursing on moral standards or reluctant to translate the most basic of those standards into law. Setting aside the distracting rhetoric of animal rights, that’s usually what these questions come down to: what moral standards should guide us in our treatment of animals, and when must those standards be applied in law?

Industrial livestock farming is among a whole range of animal-welfare concerns that extends from canned trophy-hunting to whaling to product testing on animals to all sorts of more obscure enterprises like the exotic-animal trade and the factory farming of bears in China for bile believed to hold medicinal and aphrodisiac powers. Surveying the various uses to which animals are put, some might be defensible, others abusive and unwarranted, and it’s the job of any conservative who attends to the subject to figure out which are which. We don’t need novel theories of rights to do this. The usual distinctions that conservatives draw between moderation and excess, freedom and license, moral goods and material goods, rightful power and the abuse of power, will all do just fine.

As it is, the subject hardly comes up at all among conservatives, and what commentary we do hear usually takes the form of ridicule directed at animal-rights groups. Often conservatives side instinctively with any animal-related industry and those involved, as if a thing is right just because someone can make money off it or as if our sympathies belong always with the men just because they are men.

I had an exchange once with an eminent conservative columnist on this subject. Conversation turned to my book and to factory farming. Holding his hands out in the “stop” gesture, he said, “I don’t want to know.” Granted, life on the factory farm is no one’s favorite subject, but conservative writers often have to think about things that are disturbing or sad. In this case, we have an intellectually formidable fellow known to millions for his stern judgments on every matter of private morality and public policy. Yet nowhere in all his writings do I find any treatment of any cruelty issue, never mind that if you asked him he would surely agree that cruelty to animals is a cowardly and disgraceful sin.

And when the subject is cruelty to farmed animals—the moral standards being applied in a fundamental human enterprise—suddenly we’re in forbidden territory and “I don’t want to know” is the best he can do. But don’t we have a responsibility to know? Maybe the whole subject could use his fine mind and his good heart.

As for the rights of animals, rights in general are best viewed in tangible terms, with a view to actual events and consequences. Take the case of a hunter in Texas named John Lockwood, who has just pioneered the online safari. At his canned-hunting ranch outside San Antonio, he’s got a rifle attached to a camera and the camera wired up to the Internet, so that sportsmen going to Live-shot.com will actually be able to fire at baited animals by remote control from their computers. “If the customer were to wound the animal,” explains the San Antonio Express-News, “a staff person on site could finish it off.” The “trophy mounts” taken in these heroics will then be prepared and shipped to the client’s door, and if it catches on Lockwood will be a rich man.

Very much like animal farming today, the hunting “industry” has seen a collapse in ethical standards, and only in such an atmosphere could Lockwood have found inspiration for this latest innovation—denying wild animals the last shred of respect. Under the laws of Texas and other states, Lockwood and others in his business use all sorts of methods once viewed as shameful: baits, blinds, fences to trap hunted animals in ranches that advertise a “100-percent-guaranteed kill.” Affluent hunters like to unwind by shooting cage-reared pheasants, ducks, and other birds, firing away as the fowl of the air are released before them like skeet, with no limit on the day’s kill. Hunting supply stores are filled with lures, infrared lights, high-tech scopes, and other gadgetry to make every man a marksman.

Lockwood doesn’t hear anyone protesting those methods, except for a few of those nutty activist types. Why shouldn’t he be able to offer paying customers this new hunting experience as well? It is like asking a smut-peddler to please have the decency to keep children out of it. Lockwood is just one step ahead of the rest, and there is no standard of honor left to stop him.

First impressions are usually correct in questions of cruelty to animals, and here most of us would agree that Live-shot.com does not show our fellow man at his best. We would say that the whole thing is a little tawdry and even depraved, that the creatures Lockwood has “in stock” are not just commodities. We would say that these animals deserve better than the fate he has in store for them.

As is invariably the case in animal-rights issues, what we’re really looking for are safeguards against cruel and presumptuous people. We are trying to hold people to their obligations, people who could spare us the trouble if only they would recognize a few limits on their own conduct.

Conservatives like the sound of “obligation” here, and those who reviewed Dominion were relieved to find me arguing more from this angle than from any notion of rights. “What the PETA crowd doesn’t understand,” Jonah Goldberg wrote, “or what it deliberately confuses, is that human compassion toward animals is an obligation of humans, not an entitlement for animals.” Another commentator put the point in religious terms: “[W]e have a moral duty to respect the animal world as God’s handiwork, treating animals with ‘the mercy of our Maker’ … But mercy and respect for animals are completely different from rights for animals—and we should never confuse the two.” Both writers confessed they were troubled by factory farming and concluded with the uplifting thought that we could all profit from further reflection on our obligation of kindness to farm animals.

The only problem with this insistence on obligation is that after a while it begins to sounds like a hedge against actually being held to that obligation. It leaves us with a high-minded attitude but no accountability, free to act on our obligations or to ignore them without consequences, personally opposed to cruelty but unwilling to impose that view on others.

Treating animals decently is like most obligations we face, somewhere between the most and the least important, a modest but essential requirement to living with integrity. And it’s not a good sign when arguments are constantly turned to precisely how much is mandatory and how much, therefore, we can manage to avoid.

If one is using the word “obligation” seriously, moreover, then there is no practical difference between an obligation on our end not to mistreat animals and an entitlement on their end not to be mistreated by us. Either way, we are required to do and not do the same things. And either way, somewhere down the logical line, the entitlement would have to arise from a recognition of the inherent dignity of a living creature. The moral standing of our fellow creatures may be humble, but it is absolute and not something within our power to confer or withhold. All creatures sing their Creator’s praises, as this truth is variously expressed in the Bible, and are dear to Him for their own sakes.

A certain moral relativism runs through the arguments of those hostile or indifferent to animal welfare—as if animals can be of value only for our sake, as utility or preference decrees. In practice, this outlook leaves each person to decide for himself when animals rate moral concern. It even allows us to accept or reject such knowable facts about animals as their cognitive and emotional capacities, their conscious experience of pain and happiness.

Elsewhere in contemporary debates, conservatives meet the foe of moral relativism by pointing out that, like it or not, we are all dealing with the same set of physiological realities and moral truths. We don’t each get to decide the facts of science on a situational basis. We do not each go about bestowing moral value upon things as it pleases us at the moment. Of course, we do not decide moral truth at all: we discern it. Human beings in their moral progress learn to appraise things correctly, using reasoned moral judgment to perceive a prior order not of our devising.

C.S. Lewis in The Abolition of Man calls this “the doctrine of objective value, the belief that certain attitudes are really true, and others really false, to the kind of thing the universe is and the kind of things we are.” Such words as honor, piety, esteem, and empathy do not merely describe subjective states of mind, Lewis reminds us, but speak to objective qualities in the world beyond that merit those attitudes in us. “[T]o call children delightful or old men venerable,” he writes, “is not simply to record a psychological fact about our own parental or filial emotions at the moment, but to recognize a quality which demands a certain response from us whether we make it or not.”

This applies to questions of cruelty as well. A kindly attitude toward animals is not a subjective sentiment; it is the correct moral response to the objective value of a fellow creature. Here, too, rational and virtuous conduct consists in giving things their due and in doing so consistently. If one animal’s pain—say, that of one’s pet—is real and deserving of sympathy, then the pain of essentially identical animals is also meaningful, no matter what conventional distinctions we have made to narrow the scope of our sympathy. If it is wrong to whip a dog or starve a horse or bait bears for sport or grossly abuse farm animals, it is wrong for all people in every place.

The problem with moral relativism is that it leads to capriciousness and the despotic use of power. And the critical distinction here is not between human obligations and animal rights, but rather between obligations of charity and obligations of justice.

Active kindness to animals falls into the former category. If you take in strays or help injured wildlife or donate to animal charities, those are fine things to do, but no one says you should be compelled to do them. Refraining from cruelty to animals is a different matter, an obligation of justice not for us each to weigh for ourselves. It is not simply unkind behavior, it is unjust behavior, and the prohibition against it is non-negotiable. Proverbs reminds us of this—“a righteous man regardeth the life of his beast, but the tender mercies of the wicked are cruel”—and the laws of America and of every other advanced nation now recognize the wrongfulness of such conduct with our cruelty statutes. Often applying felony-level penalties to protect certain domestic animals, these state and federal statutes declare that even though your animal may elsewhere in the law be defined as your property, there are certain things you may not do to that creature, and if you are found harming or neglecting the animal, you will answer for your conduct in a court of justice.

There are various reasons the state has an interest in forbidding cruelty, one of which is that cruelty is degrading to human beings. The problem is that many thinkers on this subject have strained to find indirect reasons to explain why cruelty is wrong and thereby to force animal cruelty into the category of the victimless crime. The most common of these explanations asks us to believe that acts of cruelty matter only because the cruel person does moral injury to himself or sullies his character—as if the man is our sole concern and the cruelly treated animal is entirely incidental.

Once again, the best test of theory is a real-life example. In 2002, Judge Alan Glenn of Tennessee’s Court of Criminal Appeals heard the case of a married couple named Johnson, who had been found guilty of cruelty to 350 dogs lying sick, starving, or dead in their puppy-mill kennel—a scene videotaped by police. Here is Judge Glenn’s response to their supplications for mercy:

“The victims of this crime were animals that could not speak up to the unbelievable conduct of Judy Fay Johnson and Stanley Paul Johnson that they suffered. Several of the dogs have died and most had physical problems such as intestinal worms, mange, eye problems, dental problems and emotional problems and socialization problems … . Watching this video of the conditions that these dogs were subjected to was one of the most deplorable things this Court has observed. …

“[T]his Court finds that probation would not serve the ends of justice, nor be in the best interest of the public, nor would this have a deterrent effect for such gross behavior. … The victims were particularly vulnerable. You treated the victims with exceptional cruelty. …

“There are those who would argue that you should be confined in a house trailer with no ventilation or in a cell three-by-seven with eight or ten other inmates with no plumbing, no exercise and no opportunity to feel the sun or smell fresh air. However, the courts of this land have held that such treatment is cruel and inhuman, and it is. You will not be treated in the same way that you treated these helpless animals that you abused to make a dollar.”

Only in abstract debates of moral or legal theory would anyone quarrel with Judge Glenn’s description of the animals as “victims” or deny that they were entitled to be treated better. Whether we call this a “right” matters little, least of all to the dogs, since the only right that any animal could possibly exercise is the right to be free from human abuse, neglect, or, in a fine old term of law, other “malicious mischief.” What matters most is that prohibitions against human cruelty be hard and binding. The sullied souls of the Johnsons are for the Johnsons to worry about. The business of justice is to punish their offense and to protect the creatures from human wrongdoing. And in the end, just as in other matters of morality and justice, the interests of man are served by doing the right thing for its own sake.

There is only one reason for condemning cruelty that doesn’t beg the question of exactly why cruelty is a wrong, a vice, or bad for our character: that the act of cruelty is an intrinsic evil. Animals cruelly dealt with are not just things, not just an irrelevant detail in some self-centered moral drama of our own. They matter in their own right, as they matter to their Creator, and the wrongs of cruelty are wrongs done to them. As The Catholic Encyclopedia puts this point, there is a “direct and essential sinfulness of cruelty to the animal world, irrespective of the results of such conduct on the character of those who practice it.”

Our cruelty statutes are a good and natural development in Western law, codifying the claims of animals against human wrongdoing, and, with the wisdom of men like Judge Glenn, asserting those claims on their behalf. Such statutes, however, address mostly random or wanton acts of cruelty. And the persistent animal-welfare questions of our day center on institutional cruelties—on the vast and systematic mistreatment of animals that most of us never see.

Having conceded the crucial point that some animals rate our moral concern and legal protection, informed conscience turns naturally to other animals—creatures entirely comparable in their awareness, feeling, and capacity for suffering. A dog is not the moral equal of a human being, but a dog is definitely the moral equal of a pig, and it’s only human caprice and economic convenience that say otherwise. We have the problem that these essentially similar creatures are treated in dramatically different ways, unjustified even by the very different purposes we have assigned to them. Our pets are accorded certain protections from cruelty, while the nameless creatures in our factory farms are hardly treated like animals at all. The challenge is one of consistency, of treating moral equals equally, and living according to fair and rational standards of conduct.

Whatever terminology we settle on, after all the finer philosophical points have been hashed over, the aim of the exercise is to prohibit wrongdoing. All rights, in practice, are protections against human wrongdoing, and here too the point is to arrive at clear and consistent legal boundaries on the things that one may or may not do to animals, so that every man is not left to be the judge in his own case.

More than obligation, moderation, ordered liberty, or any of the other lofty ideals we hold, what should attune conservatives to all the problems of animal cruelty—and especially to the modern factory farm—is our worldly side. The great virtue of conservatism is that it begins with a realistic assessment of human motivations. We know man as he is, not only the rational creature but also, as Socrates told us, the rationalizing creature, with a knack for finding an angle, an excuse, and a euphemism. Whether it’s the pornographer who thinks himself a free-speech champion or the abortionist who looks in the mirror and sees a reproductive health-care services provider, conservatives are familiar with the type.

So we should not be all that surprised when told that these very same capacities are often at work in the things that people do to animals—and all the more so in our $125 billion a year livestock industry. The human mind, especially when there is money to be had, can manufacture grand excuses for the exploitation of other human beings. How much easier it is for people to excuse the wrongs done to lowly animals.

Where animals are concerned, there is no practice or industry so low that someone, somewhere, cannot produce a high-sounding reason for it. The sorriest little miscreant who shoots an elephant, lying in wait by the water hole in some canned-hunting operation, is just “harvesting resources,” doing his bit for “conservation.” The swarms of government-subsidized Canadian seal hunters slaughtering tens of thousands of newborn pups—hacking to death these unoffending creatures, even in sight of their mothers—offer themselves as the brave and independent bearers of tradition. With the same sanctimony and deep dishonesty, factory-farm corporations like Smithfield Foods, ConAgra, and Tyson Foods still cling to countrified brand names for their labels—Clear Run Farms, Murphy Family Farms, Happy Valley—to convince us and no doubt themselves, too, that they are engaged in something essential, wholesome, and honorable.

Yet when corporate farmers need barbed wire around their Family Farms and Happy Valleys and laws to prohibit outsiders from taking photographs (as is the case in two states) and still other laws to exempt farm animals from the definition of “animals” as covered in federal and state cruelty statues, something is amiss. And if conservatives do nothing else about any other animal issue, we should attend at least to the factory farms, where the suffering is immense and we are all asked to be complicit.

If we are going to have our meats and other animal products, there are natural costs to obtaining them, defined by the duties of animal husbandry and of veterinary ethics. Factory farming came about when resourceful men figured out ways of getting around those natural costs, applying new technologies to raise animals in conditions that would otherwise kill them by deprivation and disease. With no laws to stop it, moral concern surrendered entirely to economic calculation, leaving no limit to the punishments that factory farmers could inflict to keep costs down and profits up. Corporate farmers hardly speak anymore of “raising” animals, with the modicum of personal care that word implies. Animals are “grown” now, like so many crops. Barns somewhere along the way became “intensive confinement facilities” and the inhabitants mere “production units.”

The result is a world in which billions of birds, cows, pigs, and other creatures are locked away, enduring miseries they do not deserve, for our convenience and pleasure. We belittle the activists with their radical agenda, scarcely noticing the radical cruelty they seek to redress.

At the Smithfield mass-confinement hog farms I toured in North Carolina, the visitor is greeted by a bedlam of squealing, chain rattling, and horrible roaring. To maximize the use of space and minimize the need for care, the creatures are encased row after row, 400 to 500 pound mammals trapped without relief inside iron crates seven feet long and 22 inches wide. They chew maniacally on bars and chains, as foraging animals will do when denied straw, or engage in stereotypical nest-building with the straw that isn’t there, or else just lie there like broken beings. The spirit of the place would be familiar to police who raided that Tennessee puppy-mill run by Stanley and Judy Johnson, only instead of 350 tortured animals, millions—and the law prohibits none of it.

Efforts to outlaw the gestation crate have been dismissed by various conservative critics as “silly,” “comical,” “ridiculous.” It doesn’t seem that way up close. The smallest scraps of human charity—a bit of maternal care, room to roam outdoors, straw to lie on—have long since been taken away as costly luxuries, and so the pigs know the feel only of concrete and metal. They lie covered in their own urine and excrement, with broken legs from trying to escape or just to turn, covered with festering sores, tumors, ulcers, lesions, or what my guide shrugged off as the routine “pus pockets.”

C.S. Lewis’s description of animal pain—“begun by Satan’s malice and perpetrated by man’s desertion of his post”—has literal truth in our factory farms because they basically run themselves through the wonders of automation, and the owners are off in spacious corporate offices reviewing their spreadsheets. Rarely are the creatures’ afflictions examined by a vet or even noticed by the migrant laborers charged with their care, unless of course some ailment threatens production—meaning who cares about a lousy ulcer or broken leg, as long as we’re still getting the piglets?

Kept alive in these conditions only by antibiotics, hormones, laxatives, and other additives mixed into their machine-fed swill, the sows leave their crates only to be driven or dragged into other crates, just as small, to bring forth their piglets. Then it’s back to the gestation crate for another four months, and so on back and forth until after seven or eight pregnancies they finally expire from the punishment of it or else are culled with a club or bolt-gun.

As you can see at www.factoryfarming.com/gallery.htm, industrial livestock farming operates on an economy of scale, presupposing a steady attrition rate. The usual comforting rejoinder we hear—that it’s in the interest of farmers to take good care of their animals—is false. Each day, in every confinement farm in America, you will find cull pens littered with dead or dying creatures discarded like trash.

For the piglets, it’s a regimen of teeth cutting, tail docking (performed with pliers, to heighten the pain of tail chewing and so deter this natural response to mass confinement), and other mutilations. After five or six months trapped in one of the grim warehouses that now pass for barns, they’re trucked off, 355,000 pigs every day in the life of America, for processing at a furious pace of thousands per hour by migrants who use earplugs to muffle the screams. All of these creatures, and billions more across the earth, go to their deaths knowing nothing of life, and nothing of man, except the foul, tortured existence of the factory farm, having never even been outdoors.

But not to worry, as a Smithfield Foods executive assured me, “They love it.” It’s all “for their own good.” It is a voice conservatives should instantly recognize, as we do when it tells us that the fetus feels nothing. Everything about the picture shows bad faith, moral sloth, and endless excuse-making, all readily answered by conservative arguments.

We are told “they’re just pigs” or cows or chickens or whatever and that only urbanites worry about such things, estranged as they are from the realities of rural life. Actually, all of factory farming proceeds by a massive denial of reality—the reality that pigs and other animals are not just production units to be endlessly exploited but living creatures with natures and needs. The very modesty of those needs—their humble desires for straw, soil, sunshine—is the gravest indictment of the men who deny them.

Conservatives are supposed to revere tradition. Factory farming has no traditions, no rules, no codes of honor, no little decencies to spare for a fellow creature. The whole thing is an abandonment of rural values and a betrayal of honorable animal husbandry—to say nothing of veterinary medicine, with its sworn oath to “protect animal health” and to “relieve animal suffering.”

Likewise, we are told to look away and think about more serious things. Human beings simply have far bigger problems to worry about than the well being of farm animals, and surely all of this zeal would be better directed at causes of human welfare.

You wouldn’t think that men who are unwilling to grant even a few extra inches in cage space, so that a pig can turn around, would be in any position to fault others for pettiness. Why are small acts of kindness beneath us, but not small acts of cruelty? The larger problem with this appeal to moral priority, however, is that we are dealing with suffering that occurs through human agency. Whether it’s miserliness here, carelessness there, or greed throughout, the result is rank cruelty for which particular people must answer.

Since refraining from cruelty is an obligation of justice, moreover, there is no avoiding the implications. All the goods invoked in defense of factory farming, from the efficiency and higher profits of the system to the lower costs of the products, are false goods unjustly derived. No matter what right and praiseworthy things we are doing elsewhere in life, when we live off a cruel and disgraceful thing like factory farming, we are to that extent living unjustly, and that is hardly a trivial problem.

For the religious-minded, and Catholics in particular, no less an authority than Pope Benedict XVI has explained the spiritual stakes. Asked recently to weigh in on these very questions, Cardinal Ratzinger told German journalist Peter Seewald that animals must be respected as our “companions in creation.” While it is licit to use them for food, “we cannot just do whatever we want with them. ... Certainly, a sort of industrial use of creatures, so that geese are fed in such a way as to produce as large a liver as possible, or hens live so packed together that they become just caricatures of birds, this degrading of living creatures to a commodity seems to me in fact to contradict the relationship of mutuality that comes across in the Bible.”

Factory farmers also assure us that all of this is an inevitable stage of industrial efficiency. Leave aside the obvious reply that we could all do a lot of things in life more efficiently if we didn’t have to trouble ourselves with ethical restraints. Leave aside, too, the tens of billions of dollars in annual federal subsidies that have helped megafarms undermine small family farms and the decent communities that once surrounded them and to give us the illusion of cheap products. And never mind the collateral damage to land, water, and air that factory farms cause and the more billions of dollars it costs taxpayers to clean up after them. Factory farming is a predatory enterprise, absorbing profit and externalizing costs, unnaturally propped up by political influence and government subsidies much as factory-farmed animals are unnaturally sustained by hormones and antibiotics.

Even if all the economic arguments were correct, conservatives usually aren’t impressed by breathless talk of inevitable progress. I am asked sometimes how a conservative could possibly care about animal suffering in factory farms, but the question is premised on a liberal caricature of conservatism—the assumption that, for all of our fine talk about moral values, “compassionate conservatism” and the like, everything we really care about can be counted in dollars. In the case of factory farming, and the conservative’s blithe tolerance of it, the caricature is too close to the truth.

Exactly how far are we all prepared to follow these industrial and technological advances before pausing to take stock of where things stand and where it is all tending? Very soon companies like Smithfield plan to have tens of millions of cloned animals in their factory farms. Other companies are at work genetically engineering chickens without feathers so that one day all poultry farmers might be spared the toil and cost of de-feathering their birds. For years, the many shills for our livestock industry employed in the “Animal Science” and “Meat Science” departments of rural universities (we used to call them Animal Husbandry departments) have been tampering with the genes of pigs and other animals to locate and expunge that part of their genetic makeup that makes them stressed in factory farm conditions—taking away the desire to protect themselves and to live. Instead of redesigning the factory farm to suit the animals, they are redesigning the animals to suit the factory farm.

Are there no boundaries of nature and elementary ethics that the conservative should be the first to see? The hubris of such projects is beyond belief, only more because of the foolish and frivolous goods to be gained—blood-free meats and the perfect pork chop.

No one who does not profit from them can look at our modern factory farms or frenzied slaughter plants or agricultural laboratories with their featherless chickens and fear-free pigs and think, “Yes, this is humanity at our finest—exactly as things should be.” Devils charged with designing a farm could hardly have made it more severe. Least of all should we look for sanction in Judeo-Christian morality, whose whole logic is one of gracious condescension, of the proud learning to be humble, the higher serving the lower, and the strong protecting the weak.

Those religious conservatives who, in every debate over animal welfare, rush to remind us that the animals themselves are secondary and man must come first are exactly right—only they don’t follow their own thought to its moral conclusion. Somehow, in their pious notions of stewardship and dominion, we always seem to end up with singular moral dignity but no singular moral accountability to go with it.

Lofty talk about humanity’s special status among creatures only invites such questions as: what would the Good Shepherd make of our factory farms? Where does the creature of conscience get off lording it over these poor creatures so mercilessly? “How is it possible,” as Malcolm Muggeridge asked in the years when factory farming began to spread, “to look for God and sing his praises while insulting and degrading his creatures? If, as I had thought, all lambs are the Agnus Dei, then to deprive them of light and the field and their joyous frisking and the sky is the worst kind of blasphemy.”

The writer B.R. Meyers remarked in The Atlantic, “research could prove that cows love Jesus, and the line at the McDonald’s drive-through wouldn’t be one sagging carload shorter the next day …. Has any generation in history ever been so ready to cause so much suffering for such a trivial advantage? We deaden our consciences to enjoy—for a few minutes a day—the taste of blood, the feel of our teeth meeting through muscle.”

That is a cynical but serious indictment, and we must never let it be true of us in the choices we each make or urge upon others. If reason and morality are what set human beings apart from animals, then reason and morality must always guide us in how we treat them, or else it’s all just caprice, unbridled appetite with the pretense of piety. When people say that they like their pork chops, veal, or foie gras just too much ever to give them up, reason hears in that the voice of gluttony, willfulness, or at best moral complaisance. What makes a human being human is precisely the ability to understand that the suffering of an animal is more important than the taste of a treat.

Of the many conservatives who reviewed Dominion, every last one conceded that factory farming is a wretched business and a betrayal of human responsibility. So it should be a short step to agreement that it also constitutes a serious issue of law and public policy. Having granted that certain practices are abusive, cruel, and wrong, we must be prepared actually to do something about them.

Among animal activists, of course, there are some who go too far—there are in the best of causes. But fairness requires that we judge a cause by its best advocates instead of making straw men of the worst. There isn’t much money in championing the cause of animals, so we’re dealing with some pretty altruistic people who on that account alone deserve the benefit of the doubt.

If we’re looking for fitting targets for inquiry and scorn, for people with an angle and a truly pernicious influence, better to start with groups like Smithfield Foods (my candidate for the worst corporation in America in its ruthlessness to people and animals alike), the National Pork Producers Council (a reliable Republican contributor), or the various think tanks in Washington subsidized by animal-use industries for intellectual cover.

After the last election, the National Pork Producers Council rejoiced, “President Bush’s victory ensures that the U.S. pork industry will be very well positioned for the next four years politically, and pork producers will benefit from the long-term results of a livestock agriculture-friendly agenda.” But this is no tribute. And millions of good people who live in what’s left of America’s small family-farm communities would themselves rejoice if the president were to announce that he is prepared to sign a bipartisan bill making some basic reforms in livestock agriculture.

Bush’s new agriculture secretary, former Nebraska Gov. Mike Johanns, has shown a sympathy for animal welfare. He and the president might both be surprised at the number and variety of supporters such reforms would find in the Congress, from Republicans like Chris Smith and Elton Gallegly in the House to John Ensign and Rick Santorum in the Senate, along with Democrats such as Robert Byrd, Barbara Boxer, or the North Carolina congressman who called me in to say that he, too, was disgusted and saddened by hog farming in his state.

If such matters were ever brought to President Bush’s attention in a serious way, he would find in the details of factory farming many things abhorrent to the Christian heart and to his own kindly instincts. Even if he were to drop into relevant speeches a few of the prohibited words in modern industrial agriculture (cruel, humane, compassionate), instead of endlessly flattering corporate farmers for virtues they lack, that alone would help to set reforms in motion.

We need our conservative values voters to get behind a Humane Farming Act so that we can all quit averting our eyes. This reform, a set of explicit federal cruelty statutes with enforcement funding to back it up, would leave us with farms we could imagine without wincing, photograph without prosecution, and explain without excuses.

The law would uphold not only the elementary standards of animal husbandry but also of veterinary ethics, following no more complicated a principle than that pigs and cows should be able to walk and turn around, fowl to move about and spread their wings, and all creatures to know the feel of soil and grass and the warmth of the sun. No need for labels saying “free-range” or “humanely raised.” They will all be raised that way. They all get to be treated like animals and not as unfeeling machines.

On a date certain, mass confinement, sow gestation crates, veal crates, battery cages, and all such innovations would be prohibited. This will end livestock agriculture’s moral race to the bottom and turn the ingenuity of its scientists toward compassionate solutions. It will remove the federal support that unnaturally serves agribusiness at the expense of small farms. And it will shift economies of scale, turning the balance in favor of humane farmers—as those who run companies like Wal-Mart could do right now by taking their business away from factory farms.

In all cases, the law would apply to corporate farmers a few simple rules that better men would have been observing all along: we cannot just take from these creatures, we must give them something in return. We owe them a merciful death, and we owe them a merciful life. And when human beings cannot do something humanely, without degrading both the creatures and ourselves, then we should not do it at all.

(Matthew Scully served until last fall as special assistant and deputy director of speechwriting to President George W. Bush. He is the author of Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy.)

Saturday, September 24, 2005

The Way I See It

The Way I See It

Everywhere, unthinking mobs of
“independent thinkers” wield
tired clichés like cudgels,
pummeling those who dare
question “enlightened” dogma.
If “violence never solved anything,”
Cops wouldn’t have guns and
Slaves may never have been freed.
If it’s better that 10 guilty men
Go free to spare one innocent,
Why not free 100 or 1,000,000?
Clichès begin arguments,
They don’t settle them.

~ Jonah Goldberg
Editor-at-large of
National Review Online.

Tuesday, September 20, 2005

Our Rules vs. The Poor

Our Rules vs. The Poor
By William Raspberry

Monday, September 12, 2005; A19
washingtonpost.com

The Duke University class I teach on family and community had no trouble with the New Orleans "looters" who smashed store windows for food and clothing. They had done their reading, so they understood that an important element of what makes a community work is the willingness of people to abide by agreed-upon rules.

But the floods and impending starvation on the Gulf Coast, they agreed, suspended the rules. Survival was an overriding "virtue," they said -- so long as the necessities weren't taken directly from another person in similar desperate straits.

And maybe even then, some of them thought. While a few would choose to die rather than wrest food from the gnarled hands of a starving old woman, several thought that the biological imperative to survive might trump even such uncivilized behavior as that.

No senseless looting for material goods (even if the purloined laptop might become the price of a ride to Baton Rouge?). No firing on rescue workers. No carjackings. But if the waters were rising swiftly enough, and the helicopter lifts were working slowly enough, one could perhaps justify elbowing one's way nearer to the front of the rescue line. After all, though one might defer to a weaker blood relative or spouse, survival is the most basic urge there is.

Then I reminded them of what they all knew: that sometime in the next few weeks, when things have returned to normal and Hurricane Katrina has been replaced by Supreme Court confirmation hearings or escalating slaughter in Iraq as Topic A, they will see on the 6 o'clock news some teenager accused of shooting a shopkeeper or robbing a convenience store or selling crack. And the youngster's explanation for his dreadful behavior? "You got to survive."

The point of this small exercise was neither to justify lawlessness nor to raise looting to a level of particular importance in the catastrophe that befell the Gulf Coast. It was, rather, to observe that the rules -- legislated and otherwise -- that make our communities work don't exist as moral abstractions. We uphold them because they work for us -- at least until we find ourselves under water.

What we forget is that some people in some communities see themselves as under water pretty much all the time.

Our rules -- deal fairly with one another, avoid violence, obey the law -- don't always make sense to them because the rules don't always make their lives more livable. And yet we think they should go on following our rules because it makes our lives more livable.

I'm talking about poor people, of course, but not all poor people. Some poor people are among the most law-abiding people I know. But some see themselves as outcasts reduced to basic survival.

They see themselves this way in part because many Americans don't see them at all. Erstwhile visitors to New Orleans still remark how surprised they were to see the masses of the very poor holed up in the Superdome or on freeway overpasses. They had no idea !

And most of us have no idea of the desperately poor in our own towns. They don't exist for us except when crime or social cost or catastrophe puts them on our screen.

And even then we are likely to miss the point of their existence. They wouldn't be poor, we tell ourselves, if they lived by our rules. A number of e-mails of the past few days make the point: Poor people are often the cause of their own poverty.

It's mostly true. There are people who, like many of those pitiful souls we saw waiting to be rescued from the floodwaters last week, are in dire straits because they ignored our well-meant advice. But some, like those ride-less New Orleans residents who couldn't get out, simply haven't been able to translate our advice into action: Stop having babies, save enough to move away, get married.

I'm not saying it's all society's fault that our rules don't work for them. But I am saying that it is in society's interest to make sure they do, rather than sit blithely while the growing gap between them and us produces a community destroying economic disequilibrium.

What can we do? At the very least, we should see to it that no one who works hard all week has to live in poverty and without access to good health care.
willrasp@washpost.com

Sunday, September 04, 2005

Mercury and Tuna:U.S. Advice Leaves Lots of Questions

Fish Line
Mercury and Tuna:U.S. Advice Leaves Lots of Questions
Balancing Interests, Agencies Issue Guidance at Odds With EPA Risk Assessment
A Schoolboy's Sudden Setback
By PETER WALDMAN Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNALAugust 1, 2005; Page A1

SAN FRANCISCO -- One by one, Matthew Davis's fifth-grade teachers went around the table describing the 10-year-old boy. He wasn't focused in class and often missed assignments, they said. He labored at basic addition. He could barely write a simple sentence. "Our jaws dropped," says his mother, Joan Elan Davis, describing a teachers' meeting she had requested in late 2003, when her son abruptly lost interest in homework. Matthew had always excelled in school. In the fourth grade, he had written and illustrated a series of stories about a superior named Dog Man.

Ms. Davis noticed something else: Her son's fingers were starting to curl, as if he were gripping a melon. And he could no longer catch a football.

A neurologist ordered tests. They showed Matthew's blood was laced with mercury in amounts nearly double what the Environmental Protection Agency says is the safe level for exposure to the metal. Matthew had mercury poisoning, his doctors said.

The Davises had pinpointed the suspected source: tuna fish. For a year or so, starting in late 2002, Matthew had gobbled three to six ounces a day of white albacore tuna. Based on Food and Drug Administration data for canned albacore, he was consuming a daily dose of mercury at least 12 times what the EPA considered a safe level for a 60-pound child. The Davises' doctors' prescription was simple: Matthew should stop eating canned tuna.

Ms. Davis, an artist, says she and her husband, a corporate executive, had been proud of their son for choosing tuna over junk food. Now, she asks herself: "Was I a bad parent? Was it my fault I didn't know there was mercury in tuna?"

One reason she didn't know was that the government had never said so. The FDA had known for many years that canned tuna contained mercury, which studies link to learning impairment in children. Consumer groups long urged the agency to address the issue. But it wasn't until March 2004, after regulatory tussles between health advocates and the tuna industry and between clashing scientists for the FDA and EPA, that those agencies issued a mercury advisory that cited tuna. That joint EPA and FDA advisory urged limits on how much tuna children and some women should eat.

But the limits set in the advisory may exceed safe levels for some people, judging by a mercury risk assessment that the EPA produced on its own years earlier.
The federal advisory said that nursing mothers and women who are pregnant or may become so should eat no more than 12 ounces of chunk light tuna a week. For solid white albacore, which is higher in mercury, it set a six-ounce weekly limit. Young children, it said, should eat "smaller portions." No advice was given for men or older women.

The maximum mercury ingestion the EPA deems safe is one microgram a day for each 22 pounds of body weight. If a 130-pound woman ate as much albacore tuna as the joint federal advisory allows, she would exceed that safe level by 40%.

If the joint advisory had been available in 2003 and the Davises, following its advice about "smaller portions" for children, had given Matthew just half a can of albacore a week, he still would have consumed 60% more mercury than the EPA can say with confidence is safe.
"This is a glaring example of shutting out science," says Vas Aposhian, a University of Arizona toxicologist. He quit the FDA's Food Advisory Committee in early 2004 because he felt the agency ignored the panel's instructions to hew closely to the EPA's mercury maximum.
Senior EPA and FDA officials deny the advisory is unscientific. The EPA's daily limit for mercury intake, called a "reference dose," isn't some "bright line" that distinguishes safe from unsafe, officials of both agencies say. To provide an ample margin of safety, the EPA had set the limit at just one-tenth of the mercury level that had been found to affect children's learning.

And the EPA limit is extra-cautious in another way, says David Acheson, the FDA's director of food safety and security. It was based on a study of prodigious fish eaters in the Faroe Islands of Denmark that found neurobehavioral effects, such as learning and language deficits, in children who'd had high bloodstream mercury at birth. But those effects were "subtle" and insubstantial, Dr. Acheson emphasizes, not "clear, long-lasting mental disability."

The struggle to find the right balance on mercury is part of a larger issue: How to deal with dozens of industrial chemicals now known to linger in the environment and the human body in trace amounts. Mercury emissions, about 40% of which in the U.S. come from coal-fired power plants, settle into oceans, lakes and rivers. Then people take in mercury by eating large fish that have accumulated an organic form of the metal in their flesh by consuming smaller fish.
People vary in how they react to mercury they ingest and how fast they purge it. The EPA's exposure limit is based on its calculation that mercury above 5.8 parts per billion in young women's bloodstreams may pose a danger to their babies. By this measure, 5.7% of U.S. infants, or 228,000 a year, could be at risk of mercury poisoning during gestation, based on the latest blood survey of women of childbearing age by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
The maximum safe level might be lower still, says the EPA's top mercury risk assessor, Kathryn Mahaffey, based on recent evidence that fetuses concentrate more mercury in their blood than do their pregnant mothers.

Former EPA Administrator Michael Leavitt says the reason the government didn't make the mercury-in-fish advisory tougher was to avoid scaring people away from fish. "Mercury is bad and fish is good. We needed to choose the right words that would give people a sense of knowledge without creating unwarranted fear," says Mr. Leavitt, now head of the Health and Human Services Department. He adds that scientists, not bureaucrats, worked out the guidelines, reconciling the varying views of FDA and EPA researchers.

The EPA senior scientist handling that reconciliation, Rita Schoeny, says there is no way to know for sure whether people who follow the fish advisory and consume more mercury than the EPA's limit are actually safe. Asked whether she agreed with what the advisory said about tuna, she didn't respond except to say: "I think what we have in the advisory is good public-health advice."

At Bumble Bee Seafoods, executive vice president John Stiker acknowledges the federal tuna-eating advice could lead some people to exceed the EPA safe level for mercury. But he says it's not a big problem because the average American eats only 10 servings of tuna a year, and just 35% of that is the higher-mercury type, albacore.

Food companies have long lobbied to mitigate any FDA action on canned tuna, one of the top-grossing supermarket items in revenue per unit of shelf space. Five years ago, after risk assessments by the EPA and the National Academy of Sciences raised fresh worries about mercury, the FDA began preparing to revise a 1979 advisory that said it was all right to consume four micrograms of mercury a day per 22 pounds of body weight -- four times the EPA's maximum.

Food companies urged the FDA not to single out canned tuna. In private meetings with FDA officials in fall 2000, industry and agency documents show, the industry argued that health data were inconclusive, that citing canned tuna would drive down its consumption by 19% to 24%, and that seafood producers "would face the distinct possibility of numerous class action lawsuits."

A strict advisory "could have an irreversible impact on American dietary habits, profoundly affecting consumers and producers of seafood and resulting in significant segments of the population turning away from the proven health benefits of fish consumption," said a 2000 letter to an FDA commissioner from three trade groups: the National Food Processors Association, the National Fisheries Institute and the U.S. Tuna Foundation.

When the FDA issued a revised mercury advisory in 2001, it urged women of childbearing age to shun four high-mercury species: swordfish, shark, king mackerel and tilefish from the Gulf of Mexico. It didn't mention tuna. Yet cumulatively, according to data provided by the EPA, the four species it urged avoiding account for less than 10% of Americans' mercury ingestion from fish, while canned tuna accounts for about 34% of it.

Echoing industry arguments, FDA scientists also rejected the study of fish eaters in Denmark's Faroe Islands, saying dietary differences made the data inapplicable to Americans. The FDA stood by its 1979 mercury-consumption limit that was much higher than the EPA's.
Some EPA scientists griped that FDA officials were coddling food companies. "They really consider the fish industry to be their clients, rather than the U.S. public," charges Deborah Rice, a former EPA toxicologist now working for the state of Maine. The FDA's Dr. Acheson denies that commercial concerns played a role in the agency's decision making.

Change of Course

In April 2003, his agency changed course, following years of prodding by health advocates, some members of Congress and the agency's own outside food advisory panel. The FDA said it would base future mercury warnings on the EPA's stricter limit. Late in 2003, FDA and EPA officials proposed their first joint mercury advisory at a meeting of the FDA's Food Advisory Committee.

At the hearing, FDA scientists said they had put fish in three categories: high in mercury, medium and low. The level for the low-mercury group was that of canned light tuna, explained FDA official Clark Carrington. "In order to keep the market share at a reasonable level, we felt like we had to keep light tuna in the low-mercury group," he said, according to the meeting's official transcript.

Later, the FDA's Dr. Acheson reiterated that point. He told the meeting the fish categories "were arbitrarily chosen to put light tuna in the low category."

Says Maine's Dr. Rice: "Here's the FDA making what are supposed to be scientific decisions on the basis of market share. What else is there to say?"

Asked about this, Dr. Acheson gives a different reason why the low-mercury group was pegged to light tuna. He says it was because a woman weighing 140 pounds could eat 12 ounces of it a week and stay at or below the EPA reference dose.

The FDA's outside advisory panel asked the agencies to rework the advisory, saying it didn't adequately spell out mercury risks from canned tuna. In particular, members of the panel urged a specific warning about the higher-mercury albacore tuna.

But food processors lobbied the administration. At the White House, they implored officials not to single out albacore. They said doing so would only drive people, especially the poor, to eat more junk food, says a scientist who was there.

In meetings with companies, there are indications administration officials sometimes expressed views not in sync with those of all agency scientists.

At the EPA, three companies met with Steve Johnson, then deputy administrator, on Feb. 23, 2004. The three were the StarKist unit of Del Monte Foods Co.; Chicken of the Sea, part of Thailand's Thai Union Frozen Products PCL; and Bumble Bee, which is owned by Connors Bros. Income Fund in Toronto.

The three companies later wrote to then-EPA chief Mr. Leavitt that Mr. Johnson -- who now heads the agency -- had assured them that "the EPA did not consider any children to be at risk from mercury poisoning." An EPA spokeswoman denies Mr. Johnson said that. Asked about the denial, Bumble Bee's Mr. Stiker said, "I was at the meeting. It was clear that that was said at the meeting by Steve Johnson and others in that room.... We were assured the EPA did not consider any U.S. children to be at risk of mercury poisoning."

The FDA tested the planned advisory with focus groups of women of childbearing age, the target of the warning. Some complained they didn't understand the vague advice to give kids "smaller portions." Others said the advisory was ambiguous because it encouraged them to eat fish but not too much.

'His Brain Food'

Like many parents, the Davises in San Francisco always thought fish was great. They knew it
was high in omega-3 fatty acids, which they understood could help brain development. They were delighted, Ms. Davis says, when Matthew started eating what she calls "his brain food" for lunch and snacks.

It struck Matthew that something was wrong one day at recess, he says, when his buddy Zach could suddenly catch and throw a football much better than he could. He remembers his father, a little while later, getting frustrated when his son couldn't hit a baseball. "I kept telling Dad I was rusty," Matthew says.

After the meeting with his teachers, the Davises spent thousands of dollars on tutors, but still Matthew struggled. A specialist gave him a diagnosis of "mixed learning disability," which just made his parents mad because they had watched him do so well in school before.

Then Matthew's father happened to read an article in the San Francisco Chronicle describing adults with similar problems as a possible result of eating too much swordfish, tuna steaks and other high-end fish in restaurants. Ms. Davis remembers bolting to the pantry and throwing away eight pouches and 20 cans of StarKist albacore tuna.

Spokeswomen for StarKist and Chicken of the Sea referred questions to the U.S. Tuna Foundation. The trade group's executive director, David Burney, says the study of mercury in heavy fish eaters of the Faroe Islands had found only minor effects in kids. It wasn't as if they "couldn't function in school," he says, adding: "There is no connection between a learning disability and mercury."

The notion that chronic, low-level mercury exposure can diminish children's learning capacity was affirmed in 2000 by a panel of experts convened by the National Academy of Sciences. Citing "a large body of scientific evidence showing adverse neurodevelopmental effects" on children from mercury, the NAS panel endorsed the EPA's choice of the 1997 Faroe Islands study, led by Philippe Grandjean of Harvard, as the basis for the agency's reference dose.
It noted that a similar study of fish eaters in the Seychelles Islands in 1998 hadn't found any effects on childhood development from mercury-tainted fish, but concluded the Faroe Islands results were more reliable because they were firmly supported by other studies.

Matthew Davis's symptoms -- declines in concentration, coordination and learning ability -- were classic signs of mercury toxicity, says one of his doctors, Jane Hightower, who has published studies of such toxicity in her patients. She notes that in some kinds of fish, mercury content varies widely, exposing diners to random spikes. In chunk light tuna and snapper, some samples had seven times as much mercury as the average for the species, as measured by the FDA. Certain samples of canned albacore tuna showed a spike to 2½ times the average.
As for the fresh and frozen tuna found in tuna steaks, its mean mercury level was comparable to that of canned albacore.

Industry Marketing

The tuna industry has continued to aim some marketing at pregnant women and kids. An ad sponsored by the U.S. Tuna Foundation last year, which specified the new federal consumption guidelines, reassured "pregnant and nursing women and young children" that canned tuna "is absolutely safe to eat." Extolling the benefits of fish's omega-3 fatty acids for babies' eyes and brains, the ad said: "No government study has ever found unsafe levels of mercury in women or young children who eat canned tuna."

By "unsafe levels," says the foundation's Mr. Burney, the ad wasn't referring to mercury above what the EPA declares safe, but to the actual blood-mercury level of Faroe Islands infants. That level is 10 times as high as the EPA's safe level.

Mr. Burney maintains that no Americans come close to having a toxic level of mercury in their blood. Accordingly, he rejects the notion that Matthew Davis or anyone else could get mercury poisoning from eating canned tuna. "That's the dumbest thing I've ever heard in my life," Mr. Burney says.

Bumble Bee's Mr. Stiker, when told of Matthew's problem, said it didn't make sense to him because only early-childhood development can be affected by trace amounts of mercury. "The hype has far outstripped the science" on mercury in fish, he said, with the result that canned-tuna sales are falling more than 10% a year. "We're getting killed because of this perception," he said.

Today, nearly two years after Matthew quit eating albacore tuna, his blood-mercury level is zero and his condition is dramatically improved. Although his doctors don't know if he had any permanent damage, signs so far are that he didn't. Sports and homework come much easier again. Matthew played the lead in a local performance of "Charlie and the Chocolate Factory." He is writing stories again.

His mother wrote about her son's struggle for the school newsletter. The family hasn't consulted a lawyer and doesn't plan to sue anyone, Ms. Davis says. But "I think about what I could have lost, and it makes me angry," she says.

The American Medical Association called on the FDA a year ago to consider requiring stores to post warnings and mercury-content data wherever fish is sold. Dr. Acheson of the FDA says the agency opposes mandated warning labels or market postings. "We feel the best way to get the word out is via the advisory," he says, calling it "an optimal balance between the benefits of eating fish and the risks of mercury."

Write to Peter Waldman at peter.waldman@wsj.com

Lost in a Faithless Age

Lost in a Faithless Age
When doctors don't have all the answers, is there anyplace else to turn?
By LUCETTE LAGNADO
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL June 20, 2005; Page R7

"Do you believe in miracles?" I asked a friend of mine one recent Saturday morning. The man, an affable, down-to-earth developer, seemed startled by my question. He eyed me quizzically, both amused and worried. Mostly worried. Yet, this fanciful, seemingly arcane question has been uppermost in my mind of late, as I've begun to ponder the limits of science and health care. Is there anyplace to turn when those limits are reached? Merely questioning the supremacy of medicine and the scientific establishment is discomfiting, and discussing a return to faith, prayer and even -- yes -- the possibility of a miracle can be almost taboo. Or worse than that, hokey.

Those of us who were raised in the West are taught at an early age to revere rigorous scientific thought, and to cast a wary eye on inchoate notions involving mysterious higher forces. The only deity many people revere is their specialist, while hospitals have replaced churches as houses of worship. Modern medical centers and laboratories even look like churches, or rather, cathedrals, with their outsized architecture, the small fortunes they cost to build, and the awe they trigger. No matter the mistakes they can make, the dismal cure rates for some diseases, the hype around drugs and treatments that can turn out to be painful and pricey and ineffective. No matter the heartbreak so many of us have felt at these "leading" institutions, and in the hands of "top" doctors when they had no more answers to offer us or our loved ones. It can be so jarring when the men and women we're programmed to see as superhuman turn out to be only too human, and they can't offer any more solutions. There are no more clinical trials for the tumor.

There is no relief for the chronic pain. What then? That was the question I was seeking to answer: What then? As a little girl in Cairo, Egypt, where I was born and spent my early childhood, I had a very different belief system -- one where prayer and faith played as important a role as doctors and institutions. There was no conflict, real or imagined, between science and religion, between seeking concrete treatments and praying for supernatural intervention. The two ideally worked hand in hand. People there who were sick were as likely to visit a shrine as a hospital, where they would seek the counsel of a rabbi, priest or imam, as earnestly as they consulted a physician. My father taught me to respect doctors, and to look up to them. He always addressed them deferentially, and I took my cue from him. Yet I also understood -- perhaps better than my American friends would, years later -- that physicians were limited, possibly flawed, and that the tools at their disposal didn't always work. I learned, in short, that I couldn't depend on them for all the answers.

Now, to be sure, a physician in 2005 New York may have a lot more to work with than his Cairene counterpart did some four decades ago -- or even now for that matter -- but a fundamental truth remains: The technology and medicines are still imperfect even here in the West, where we boast about our "advanced" facilities and our "miracle" drugs. What I learned from the start was to put my faith in a higher power as well as in medicine -- to believe that somewhere in the intersection of God and modern science, relief could come. When I became ill as a 6-year-old in Egypt, my parents hedged their bets. They instantly sought out medical solutions. I was dragged to countless doctors and specialists. Most seemed stumped, unable to advise what to do. That is when my mom and dad started taking me on pilgrimages to an equally dizzying number of synagogues and shrines, hoping that our prayers at these holy places would produce a miracle -- the miracle the doctors couldn't deliver. The last stop was to an ancient shrine where, legend had it, I had to fall asleep so that Maimonides, the esteemed 12th-century rabbi and doctor, would visit me in a dream and heal me. I did, in fact, get better -- and to this day, I am not sure if it was because of my trips to specialists, or my stop at the shrine, or neither, or both.

Thoughts of my Cairo childhood, its mystical and religious overlays, returned to haunt me recently as I've worked on a memoir of my father. He was a man who, for much of his life, was hopelessly dependent on the medical establishment for his survival -- first the hospitals and doctors of Egypt, after he suffered a bad fall and needed surgeries and months of hospitalizations to repair his injured leg and hip, and later the clinics and hospitals of America, where we settled. Though he always seemed to be in need of doctors to relieve the pain that never went away, he also had a deep instinctual distrust of them. As I probed my father's life, I found myself increasingly drawn to his world -- the world that I had abandoned -- of "old" Cairo, with its profound sense of faith, its belief in miracles. And the more I was drawn, the more in conflict I've felt with my own adopted world, which casts a cold eye on such supposedly primitive, unscientific methods and beliefs. Miracles, my friends ask? My American sister-in-law doesn't even seem to take the question seriously. "Placebos," she declared, when I asked her about believing in the unseen and explaining the unexplainable. In her mind, faith and the belief in miracles to cure illness were nothing more than sugar pills.

The American medical system too often fails too many, she said, but that needn't dictate a return to primitive, unscientific beliefs. I wished that my father were here to answer her. I imagined him waving the little red prayer book that never left his side, and telling her that religions that sustained so many for so long couldn't be dissected and dismissed in such a peremptory fashion. Because what my dad trusted to an unwavering degree, more than the legions of doctors he consulted and the endless medical facilities where he was a patient, were his prayers. I never saw him without his tattered red prayer book in hand. Even when he was desperately ill, a thin, lonely figure lost in a sea of beds in a New York hospital, where he was shuffled from room to room, from ward to ward. Or even when he was seated in his wheelchair at the end of the hall, forgotten, in his hopelessly cold nursing home. He found comfort and safety in his little red book, and the chants and incantations they contained that he muttered to himself again and again. He prayed even when the deck was stacked against him, he prayed when doctors had given up and his own family wasn't able to do much and I felt completely helpless.

I think he never stopped hoping for that heavenly miracle, especially when earthly solutions seemed to have disappeared. It is not that he refused care, or turned away doctors. He had no choice but to depend on them all the time -- because of the fractures that had never healed, and the symptoms of Parkinson's that made his hands tremble, and a heart condition, and, ultimately, some signs of Alzheimer's, though I always felt that heartbreak and disillusionment with the new world after Cairo were as much to blame for his confusion and memory loss as any clinical diagnosis. Until he could no longer do so, until he was literally unconscious, he prayed, and waited for the divine intervention that would rescue him from his situation.

I was raised mostly here in America, and the lessons I learned my first six years as I sat next to my dad at a Cairo synagogue, or traveled with my mom to a distant shrine, began to fade. Instead, as I grew up and assimilated into my new world, as all immigrants must, I abandoned much of the magical belief system that had been such an all-embracing part of my childhood. I stopped believing in miracles and enchantments. It was all a world I'd left behind, and if I spoke about it, it was in an amused, superior tone, designed to entertain my American friends. I continued to pray, of course, but I did it less fervently, and more by rote. I continued to believe in a higher power, in God, but perhaps with less feeling, less passion. Working as a reporter, I began to cover the American health system, and became immersed in its wonders and enchantments. I believed in "miracle drugs" and was sure of their limitless possibilities. My desk was papered with press releases announcing new technologies, new therapies, new approaches to old treatments. The illusion was of constant motion and progress. Now there was magic we could all believe in -- the grand, kaleidoscopic world of major drug companies, and major medical centers. Everything made it easy to believe in the new religion of modern medicine. Even when these drugs didn't live up to their promise, there were rarely major announcements, and when patients fared poorly, institutions didn't trumpet the setbacks. And of course, it was so much easier to view the dazzling hospital buildings being built, the laboratories sprouting up, the research institutions acquiring more and more real estate, from the safe vantage point of an observer, rather than a patient -- or a patient's daughter.

Gradually, though, I began to wonder whether I was worshiping too blindly. I tried to force myself to look at a situation through a patient's eyes -- and, eventually, through my father's eyes. The hospital room that seems so modern and efficient to a reporter walking around with a public-relations specialist can be awfully cold and scary to the person forced to spend a night in it. The doctor who is so articulate and knowledgeable in his laboratory can be intimidating and dismissive when dealing with an ailing person who doesn't understand medical jargon. I'd heard too many stories of doctors who look to patients as guinea pigs to try promising treatments, and when the treatments fail, they move on to another patient, another guinea pig. Suddenly I found myself remembering my dead 12th-century mystic and physician at the Cairo shrine, and how kind he was supposed to be, even in a dream.

When I returned to Egypt in April for my first visit since I'd left as a child, I had no desire to explore the Pyramids or the Sphinx. What I wanted to see were the shrines -- the holy sites I had been taken to as a little girl in the throes of my own medical crisis. I wanted to immerse myself in this world that I had left behind, and that had been so profoundly meaningful to my parents, and that had become progressively lost to me. It seemed desperately important to seek out societies that held out different kinds of hopes, that weren't beholden to technology, yet also weren't rebelling against it. They were all there, my shrines and synagogues -- older, more frayed, far more damaged than I'd remembered them, or half-remembered them. I decided to say prayers in each one of them. Oddly, I found myself thinking not of that time I was a child and ailing in Egypt, but when I was a teenager and sick in America. The symptoms were worrisome, and though we were in New York, there didn't seem many options for an immigrant family without money or contacts or knowledge of the medical system. I felt as dizzy and scared as the 6-year-old I'd once been. And there weren't even shrines in New York I could turn to for comfort. Hand in hand with my parents, I began making the rounds -- to this doctor and that, this specialist and that one, from one hospital to another. Whoever would see me, I saw.

We finally found the ideal doctor -- someone willing to care for me, even ready to promise that I would be well again. Burton Lee was a doctor at the world-renowned Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New York, and though he was fanciful, he wasn't the least bit mystical in his approach. He was cool and crisp and scientific in setting out the course of my treatment. But he also managed an amazing feat: He was reassuring and utterly humane, even as he spouted science with a voice of learning and precision. He vowed to me that I would be well again. One morning, some weeks later, I woke up to a knock on the door. It was my father, and he had brought home a guest -- an elderly rabbi with a severe hunchback, who walked with a cane. The rabbi approached me, put his hand on my head, and began to chant prayers -- Hebrew prayers, Arabic prayers. I couldn't understand a word. I sat silently through the incantations and closed my eyes. When he was through, the holy man vowed that I would be well again. I noticed that my father was smiling for the first time since the onset of my illness.

To this day I am not sure what worked: Dr. Lee, my American doctor, and his meticulous ministering, or the heartfelt chants of the aged Levantine rabbi. I can hear my father chuckling: Of course a miracle had taken place, he would say, but he'd remind me that miracles can come in a thousand shapes and forms. They don't have to be Cecil B. DeMille-style partings of the Red Sea. In my case the miracle could well have been finding my American physician.

--Ms. Lagnado, a senior special writer in The Wall Street Journal's New York bureau, is working on a memoir of her father for Ecco/HarperCollins